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Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch
NATO: Conventional Deterrence is the New Black
After Ukraine, conventional deterrence will be the main purpose of NATO’s armed forces. NATO
contingency planning, operational training and defense planning will all revolve around
conventional deterrence. Russia’s ready use of force in Ukraine, Georgia and beyond shows that
its non-NATO neighbors are very much at risk for military intervention. President Putin challenges
the post-Cold War order by breaking the rules underlying its stability. His means include the use
of covert agents to stage unrest and create excuses for Russia to intervene in the supposed
name of Russian-speaking minorit ies. Could Moscow apply the same measures in a NATO country
with a signif icant Russian minority population, such as Latvia? This question should keep NATO
leaders up at night and by the morning they should realize that the solution is conventional
deterrence.
Why conventional deterrence? A superf icial structural balance of  power analysis suggests that Russia will
be deterred by NATO’s nuclear arsenal and will theref ore not launch Ukraine-style operations against NATO
members. But NATO never relied on nuclear deterrence alone. For deterrence to work, a convincing part of
it must exist in t ime and in place. Simply put, as the ability to project power declines with distance, so does
the ability to deter. An American carrier group in the Pacif ic is not a carrier group in the Baltic or Black Seas.
Some – credible – conventional deterrence is necessary in the region. Russia is less likely to overreach if
its f orces cannot cross the border unharmed.
When it comes to risk perceptions, geography matters and the relevant comparison may not be between
Russia’s def ense budget (around USD68 billion according to the Military Balance) and the U.S. budget
(around 600 billion), but between Russia and the aggregate def ense budgets of  Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania (around 1.2 billion). While Russia is unlikely to commit the bulk of  its armed f orces in an incursion
against a Baltic state, Russia’s conventional advantage in the region is still decisive. Only conventional
deterrence can make sure that Russian decision-makers do not come to think that they could invade NATO
territory without major military costs.
The credibility of  deterrence rests on the actual ability to interdict and punish any challenger. The insurance
premium has to be paid f or insurance to work, and the lock on the door has to be locked to be ef f ective.
NATO’s contingency plans f or the Baltic countries and beyond should be backed up by a corresponding
change in the Level of  Ambition (NATO’s agreed f orce posture) as well as in extended training and
exercises and a repurposing of  the NATO Response Force.
In order to size and evaluate these init iatives, NATO and the wider security and def ense community would
do well to rediscover the tenets of  conventional deterrence. In the 1980s, the strategic debate was all
about the necessary f orce-to-space ratios on German soil. Given Russia’s recent actions, these debates
will be revived in a more complicated f orm because of  the new geography of  NATO, which now includes the
Baltic and Black Seas.
But conventional deterrence is not straightf orward, either in practice or in theory. Some questions are
linear: How to size capabilit ies f or deterrence? How much is enough? Others are non- linear: What about
polit ical f eedback loops? Can wrongly t imed or sized deterrence or even the contemplation of  deterrence
lead to counter-reactions f rom Russia? Will the deployment or projected deployment of  f orce meant to
deter aggravate rather than mitigate the likelihood of  a conventional conf lict across a NATO border? It is
important to know whether a given amount of  military capability actually deters attacks – and which f actors
may af f ect it and how. Are these f actors limited to the quality and quantity of  military capacities? Or do they
also include perceptions and psychology among the responsible leaders? The precise meanings of  general,
nuclear and conventional deterrence, the relationship between the dif f erent parts, and the question of
predictability have all been the subjects of  extensive academic, strategic and polit ical discussions since the
af termath of  Hiroshima. Developed by Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn and more early in the Cold War, the
deterrence and conventional deterrence literature blossomed in the 1980s with John J. Mearsheimer and
Richard K. Betts.
Conventional deterrence in particular t ies together military and polit ical strategy.  The Cold War debate
about deterrence was not abstract or academic, but in f act deeply polit ical, in ways that should be
instructive to policymakers today. In Europe, the shif t f rom the doctrine of  “massive retaliation” to “f lexible
response” was met with serious reservations exactly because it was tied to the balance between nuclear
and conventional deterrence and because it was seen to increase the risk of  conventional conf lict.
“Massive retaliation” was based on a pref erence f or nuclear over conventional deterrence and on the
premise (or threat) that any aggression would be met with an overwhelming nuclear response. “Flexible
response,” in contrast, emphasized deterrence at all levels, including the conventional. By introducing more
steps on the escalation ladder it would reduce the risk of  an unwanted and automatic global escalation of  a
conf lict.
Yet crit ics pointed out that having more steps on the escalation ladder also increased the risk that the
ladder would actually be climbed. While mutual nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would
avert a nuclear Armageddon, a “limited” nuclear war in Europe or a conventional war, limited geographically
to Europe could be made possible in this way. On the other hand, they argued, if  Soviet and American
leaders expected an automatic escalation to nuclear weapons, then Europe’s territory would be less likely
to become the scene of  a proxy conf lict between the two superpowers. The transit ion f rom “massive
retaliation” to “f lexible response” was theref ore controversial. In the same vein, military strategy options f or
NATO in Germany were limited by polit ical concerns to f orward def ense as neither def ense in depth nor
of f ensive strategies were f ound polit ically palatable. Whatever the potential military strategic merits of
def ense in depth, polit ical leaders could not accept the prospect of  war across their territory. Inside NATO,
conventional deterrence was theref ore both a necessary part of  the overall f orce mix and a polit ically
contested mechanism.
In 2014 and beyond, conventional deterrence will similarly be bound and shaped as much by polit ical as by
military concerns. How will contingency planning and concomitant military preparations address the new
polit ical and military geography of  the Alliance, especially in the Baltics? Will the Alliance now plan f or
signif icant, permanently deployed f orces, or f or residual f orces and quick response f orces? Does the
Baltic space call f or new amphibious capabilit ies? Will there be polit ical consensus to develop and manage
the implementation of  such plans? Will NATO and its member nations be able to comprehend, communicate
and coordinate such a military move within a larger grand strategy f ramework that both deters and engages
with Russia in the long term? Will NATO and EU nations be able to coordinate such a f ramework? No
matter how the broader strategy plays out, issues of  conventional deterrence are sure to be at the heart
of  the discussions – both in terms of  the theory and practice, and the polit ical and military strategy, of
conventional deterrence.
For the United States, the centrality of  conventional deterrence means a triple challenge. The f irst part is
getting conventional deterrence right, through U.S. and Allied armed f orces, in a way that f its with a (still to
come) broader strategic response to Russia. This is dif f icult in itself  but also compounded by the second
part: the transatlantic relationship. As bef ore, conventional deterrence in Europe will be as much about the
polit ical level – dialogues as well as behind-the-scenes arm-twisting with Germany and all the other nations
– as it will be about the direct military implementation. Last but certainly not least, conventional deterrence
as a main f ocus in NATO means that America’s global alliance relationships are at stake. Taipei and Tokyo
will watch closely how the U.S. and NATO deals with Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. As the American security
establishment returns to the intricacies of  conventional deterrence it will also remember the painf ul
predicaments of  making policy f or the sake of  credibility while having to solve the problems at hand.
 
(A shorter version of  this essay was published at the Atlantic Council blog the New Atlanticist).
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